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Abstract 
 This thesis is an in-depth discussion and analysis of the alternative dispute resolution 
process of arbitration in the United States. It begins by providing a basic explanatory overview of 
arbitration clauses and the arbitration process. It then goes on to highlight the various benefits 
over traditional court litigation that arbitration has to offer. From there, the paper presents a 
detailed discussion of the many shortcomings of the arbitration process. It identifies the overall 
lack of procedural fairness that exists in arbitration today due to the fact that arbitration currently 
tends to favor businesses over consumers and workers during dispute settlements. The paper then 
identifies the various negative potential consequences that exist as a result of the unfair nature of 
arbitration today. This thesis concludes by presenting various ways that the arbitration process 
can be improved upon to make for a fairer, more neutral dispute resolution alternative.  
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Introduction 
 As a fundamental feature of the American judicial system, every citizen is entitled to his 
or her day in court. Of course, traditional court hearings are not the only way for individuals to 
seek relief; there are many alternatives to traditional trial courts. A method of dispute resolution 
that is growing in popularity in the United States, arbitration is often viewed as a preferred 
process of dispute settlement. Arbitration is essentially a legal proceeding that exists as an 
alternative to a jury trial, and it is conducted between two disputed parties and is decided on by 
an arbitrator. Arbitrations are typically sought as an alternative form of dispute resolution due to 
a mutual arbitration agreement between two parties. Offering these parties more efficiency, less 
hostility, more cost savings, increased flexibility, more simplified rules, less exposure to risk, 
and greater privacy, the arbitration process is in many ways preferable to traditional trial court 
proceedings when settling disputes.  
However, the arbitration process also offers a wide variety of shortcomings that, in many 
ways, serve to threaten the fairness of the proceedings. Having recently evolved into a process 
that largely favors big business, arbitration today exists as a procedure that is wickedly unfair for 
consumers and employees looking to seek relief from corporations that have committed 
wrongdoing. Such a shift away from justice is largely attributable to the nature of the arbitration 
process and the way in which the Supreme Court has interpreted arbitration law over the last few 
decades. One limitation of the arbitration process in this regard is the fact that it allows for a 
large amount of corporate control over the process that results in arbitration becoming incredibly 
harmful to the consumer. Control mechanisms that facilitate the engineering of the arbitration 
process to work in the favor of businesses include adhesion contracts, arbitrator biases, 
proceeding confidentiality, bootstrapping, class action waivers, and the final and binding nature 
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of the arbitrator’s decision. In addition, the fact that many Americans today tend to sign contracts 
without reading all of their terms surrenders to big business even greater power over 
proceedings. As a result of this increase in corporate control over the arbitration process, 
businesses are capable of exploiting arbitration as a method of absolute litigation risk protection.  
One consequence of this current unfair nature of arbitration is that fewer individuals are choosing 
to go forward with arbitration. Additionally, the probability of a plaintiff victory in an arbitration 
against a corporation is decreasing significantly. Perhaps worst of all, arbitration as it exists with 
its shortcomings currently is providing businesses with an opportunity to engineer arbitration 
clauses to exploit consumers and employees. Any element of the justice system that allows for 
such abuse is fundamentally flawed and desperately in need of regulation.  
Overall, arbitration does offer a plethora of advantages over traditional trial court 
proceedings. However, as the process exists today, consumers and employees are essentially 
robbed of their fundamental rights to fair dispute resolution processes. Because there are many 
benefits to pursuing arbitration over traditional court litigation, the best course of action appears 
to be to increase regulation and education in order to allow arbitration to further evolve into a 
process that is fair for all parties involved.  Adjustments to the arbitration process that can help to 
achieve this goal include: increasing consumer education regarding arbitration, limiting the use 
of arbitration in certain cases, requiring post-dispute arbitrations to be signed before proceeding, 
offering dispute resolution alternatives to arbitration, preventing the enforcement of any 
arbitration clauses that are included in adhesion contracts, requiring arbitration clauses to be less 
“buried” in contracts, refusing to enforce unconscionable terms included in said clauses, and 
putting laws in place to safeguard against arbitrator bias. Additionally, honoring statutes put in 
place by states to protect their consumers and workers would increase the overall fairness of the 
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arbitration process. Only through an execution of these changes can arbitration truly become a 
fair and preferable form of dispute resolution.  
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Chapter 1: The Basics of Arbitration 
The Arbitration Clause 
 It is impossible to understand the complexities of arbitration without first understanding 
the fundamentals of arbitration clauses themselves. An arbitration clause is, essentially, a 
contractual term that is included in a wide variety of agreements between two or more parties. 
This clause demands that any disputes that arise between these parties out of contracts or 
transactions be settled through an arbitration proceeding1. Like many elements of a contract, 
arbitration clauses can either be simple or complex. Arbitration clauses that merely state that 
disputes will be settled according to standard arbitration rules are considered simple, whereas 
more complex arbitration clauses exercise a larger amount of control over the details of the 
arbitration process2. For example, complex arbitration clauses may contain specific instructions 
for the arbitrator selection process or the proceeding’s level of confidentiality. Overall, these 
clauses have a large potential for controlling dispute resolution processes, especially when they 
are more complex. As such, complex arbitration clauses will serve as the primary focus of this 
analysis. 
 Arbitration clauses can be found in the contractual agreements for most of the goods and 
services an average individual purchases3. For example, according to New York Times journalist 
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, “It is virtually impossible to rent a car, open a bank account, get a job, 
or enroll an elderly parent in a nursing home without signing away the right to take a case to 
                                                          
1 Repa, Barbara Kate. "Arbitration Basics." Nolo.com. Accessed September 27, 2016. https://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/arbitration-basics-29947.html. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Silver-Greenberg, Jessica, and Robert Gebeloff. "Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice." Edited by 
Michael Corkery. The New York Times, November 1, 2015, New York ed. October 31, 2015. Accessed September 
7, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-
justice.html?_r=0. 
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court.”4 In addition to these types of agreements, arbitration clauses are also commonly found in 
credit card applications, e-commerce transaction agreements, cell phone contracts, and internet 
service contracts5. Truthfully, arbitration clauses have become so popular with businesses that 
even the aforementioned list fails to fully identify every industry that inserts these terms into its 
contracts. In fact, the American Arbitration Association (AAA), a dominant firm in the field of 
arbitration, has reported that they handle more than 2 million arbitration proceedings each year6. 
This stunning statistic is not by accident: according to Honore Johnson, a researcher at Cornell 
University, companies are more frequently inserting arbitration clauses into their contractual 
agreements in order to “legal up” against trending increases in litigation in the United States7. 
Considering that a Cornell University-sponsored survey of Fortune 1000 corporations recently 
found that, over the past two decades, more corporations have embraced alternative dispute 
resolution and that this trend is continuing upwards8, a corporate need for a mitigation of 
litigation risk definitely could be driving the increasing popularity of arbitration clauses. 
While they stand to be incredibly important terms in any agreement, arbitration clauses 
actually more often than not are buried deep within contracts9. As a result, most consumers and 
workers are not even aware of the amount of arbitration agreements to which they are bound10. 
While the placement or even the consumer ignorance of these clauses may not on the surface 
                                                          
4 Silver-Greenberg, Jessica, and Michael Corkery. "Bill Seeks to Limit Use of Arbitration to Avoid Courts." The 
New York Times, February 5, 2016, New York ed. February 4, 2016. Accessed September 7, 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/business/dealbook/bill-seeks-to-limit-use-of-arbitration-to-avoid-courts.html. 
5 Silver-Greenberg, Jessica, and Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice 
6 Repa, Barbara Kate. Arbitration Basics 
7 Johnson, Honore. "Adopting an Employment Arbitration Process." Dispute Resolution Journal 70, no. 4 (2015): 
65-73. http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1785505040?accountid=10141. 
8 Stipanowich, Thomas J., and J. Ryan Lamare. 2014. "Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of 
Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict Management in Fortune 1000 Corporations." Harvard Negotiation Law Review 
19. 
9 Silver-Greenberg, Jessica, and Michael Corkery. "In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System’." Compiled 
by Robert Gebeloff. The New York Times, November 2, 2015. October 1, 2015. Accessed September 26, 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html. 
10 Repa, Barbara Kate. Arbitration Basics 
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seem very material, in actuality many parties that did not notice arbitration clauses when signing 
their contracts have come up short in the dispute resolution process. Consumers have especially 
experienced the dangers of agreeing to contracts with hidden arbitration clauses over the last few 
decades. Overall, arbitration clauses often appear as minor additions to standard contractual 
agreements; however, in reality, these contractual terms carry with them an immense potential to 
demolish an individual’s fundamental right to a jury trial.  
What is Arbitration? 
 Before delving into the facets and implications of the rising popularity of arbitration 
clauses, it is vital to also establish a baseline understanding of arbitration itself. To put simply, 
arbitration is an alternative to standard trial court litigation proceedings. In this alternative 
procedure known as arbitration, a dispute between two parties is brought to a neutral individual, 
known as an arbitrator. This decision-maker is selected by the parties involved in the dispute. 
The arbitrator, upon being briefed by both parties on the details of the dispute and then reviewing 
the evidence, makes a final decision in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant. This decision 
typically is final and binding11. It is important to note that arbitration is a process that can only 
take place if both parties involved in the dispute have agreed to forgo their right to a jury trial in 
favor of this form of private dispute resolution instead12. Additionally, arbitration is very much a 
rights-based process. According to Honore Johnson, being rights-based essentially means that, in 
arbitration, one party is always deemed “right” based on either a contractual agreement or a 
statutory policy.13 This contrasts with interest-based processes, which require that the parties in 
                                                          
11 "What Is Arbitration?" WIPO. Accessed September 27, 2016. http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/what-is-
arb.html. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Johnson, Honore. Adopting an Employment Arbitration Process 
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dispute negotiate a compromise to settle their disagreement14.  Overall, arbitration as a method of 
dispute resolution is less formal, more efficient, and often less expensive than a courtroom trial.  
 Also vital to understanding arbitration is noting that there are different types of 
arbitration proceedings, and that some are more common than others are. First of all, arbitration 
can either be mandatory or voluntary. The nature of the arbitration in this regard depends on the 
willingness of the parties involved. While it was mentioned previously that arbitration is only 
possible when both parties have agreed to it, often this agreement occurs pre-dispute and, when 
push comes to shove, one party may no longer wish to enter arbitration. As a result, oftentimes 
plaintiffs find themselves in mandatory arbitration. When the proceeding is mandatory, this 
essentially means that the dispute must be resolved through arbitration because the parties have 
surrendered their rights to sue in court15. In contrast, when an arbitration is considered voluntary, 
both parties in the proceeding have agreed to arbitrate post-dispute16. In addition, arbitration can 
be either binding or nonbinding. The distinction between these two types is quite 
straightforward: if the proceeding is binding, the arbitrator’s decision is final and can only be 
overturned by a court in very special circumstances17. In spite of these special circumstances, the 
overturning of an arbitrator’s binding decision by a court is rare. In contrast, when a decision is 
nonbinding, either party may reject the decision and request a traditional courtroom trial to 
resolve the dispute instead18. Proceedings are most often mandatory and binding, leaving little 
room for either party to opt out of an arbitration decision.  
                                                          
14 Ibid. 
15 Repa, Barbara Kate. Arbitration Basics 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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 Another important aspect of arbitration is the fact that the rules of evidence that are 
typically applied in traditional courtroom proceedings do not usually apply in arbitration19. This 
essentially means that, while the parties in a trial court may be limited by the court’s restrictions 
on the amount of evidence that can be used to buttress their side of an argument in the dispute, 
parties in arbitration proceedings are not typically under these restrictions. While it is the job of 
the arbitrator to determine how much evidence is permissible in the proceeding, parties typically 
are able to present as much evidence as they need to in order to sufficiently make their cases.  
Arbitration Proceedings: A Breakdown 
 It is necessary to recognize the key steps that take place during an arbitration proceeding 
in order to establish a full understanding of this form of dispute resolution. Typically, arbitration 
begins with the selection of an arbitrator—or arbitrators—by the parties involved in the 
dispute20. Arbitrations typically only need one arbitrator present unless the dispute is for an 
amount over $50,000, in which case the procedure requires three arbitrators21. The choosing of 
the arbitrator(s) is based upon the selection process agreement included in the arbitration clause. 
Arbitrators are most often selected from large arbitration firms, such as the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA), the National Arbitration Forum, or JAMS. These firms claim 
that they “[strive] to ensure a professional process” and each firm “[requires] their arbitrators to 
disclose any conflicts of interest before taking a case.”22 Usually, before the hearing begins, 
arbitrators impose their own rules of procedure and then hold conferences with each of the 
parties to work out the details of the proceeding23.  Unlike in a trial court, arbitrators may base 
                                                          
19 " Grenig & Scanza on Arbitration: Understanding Evidence (Part I)." Dispute Resolution Journal 70, no. 3 (2015): 
85-96. http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1746615066?accountid=10141. 
20 Repa, Barbara Kate. Arbitration Basics 
21 "Arbitration." SEC.gov. October 23, 2014. Accessed October 14, 2016. http://www.sec.gov/answers/arbproc.htm. 
22 Silver-Greenberg, Jessica, and Michael Corkery. In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System’. 
23 Repa, Barbara Kate. Arbitration Basics 
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their decisions upon “their own ideas of what is fair and just,”24 in addition to principles of 
common and statutory law.  
Arbitrators possess a large amount of authority over arbitration proceedings. In addition 
to establishing procedural rules and making the final arbitration decision, arbitrators also possess 
the power to grant preliminary relief, determine the materiality of evidence, set the time and 
place for a hearing, compel the attendance of the parties in a dispute, issue subpoenas, issue 
confidentiality requirements, determine the award for the winning party, and award punitive 
damages and arbitration fees as they see fit25.  
During the actual arbitration, each party has an opportunity to make their case on the 
dispute using witnesses and evidence like in a traditional courtroom26.  At the end of the hearing, 
the arbitrator makes a decision and is required to produce a signed record of the award27. As was 
mentioned previously, the decision of the arbitrator is typically final and can only be appealed 
under very limited circumstances, such as the presence of corruption or fraud28.  
State vs. Federal Arbitration Law 
 Federal arbitration law is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA), and 
state arbitration law is governed by the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 (RUAA) in the 
states that choose to adopt it. These laws governing arbitration at a state and federal level are 
very similar, but they do have some key differences that are worth mentioning.  
                                                          
24 Ibid. 
25 Meyerson, Bruce E. "The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: 15 Years Later." Dispute Resolution Journal 71, no. 1 
(2016): 1-45. http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1795660742?accountid=10141. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Repa, Barbara Kate. Arbitration Basics 
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 At its beginning, the FAA was the result of a “push for federal legislation over arbitration 
to make arbitration agreements enforceable.”29 Two New Yorkers, Julius Cohen and Charles 
Bernheimer, had succeeded in achieving this legislation in their home state and then went to 
Congress to make their case for arbitration agreements30. The two argued that arbitration 
deserved this legislation because it was cheaper and faster than traditional litigation. Even 
further, supporters of the Act in 1925 claimed that the FAA was consumer friendly. Finding 
these arguments convincing enough, Congress unanimously agreed to pass the Federal 
Arbitration Act31.  
 Both the FAA and the RUAA are applicable to any agreement to arbitrate between two 
parties. However, the FAA requires that arbitration agreements be in writing in order to be 
enforceable, while the RUAA merely requires a record that does not necessarily need to be in 
writing32. In addition, the FAA has a much broader reach than the RUAA33. As a result, the 
RUAA attempts to answer some of the questions left open by the FAA in order to ensure 
uniform arbitration law at the state level. The RUAA also champions state law in arbitration 
proceedings, unlike the FAA34. 
This paper will focus primarily upon federal arbitration law rather than state arbitration 
law because of the Supreme Court’s tendency to favor federal arbitration standards over state 
law. This is largely because the Court supports “a national policy favoring arbitration,” which, 
according to former Arizona Court of Appeals Judge Bruce Meyerson, “[withdraws] the power 
                                                          
29 Leslie, Christopher R. "The Arbitration Bootstrap." Texas Law Review 94, no. 2 (2015): 265-330. 
http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1756953341?accountid=10141. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Meyerson, Bruce E. The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: 15 Years Later 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
15 
 
of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims…by arbitration.”35 Said 
Supreme Court decisions will be discussed in greater detail later in this analysis.  
Arbitration vs. Mediation 
 To conclude this discussion of the basics of arbitration, it must be emphasized that this 
paper is an analysis of arbitration proceedings, not mediation. While both fall within the same 
family of alternative dispute resolution methods, the two proceedings are fundamentally different 
and yield very contrasting results.  
First of all, the goals of mediation and arbitration differ largely. While both proceedings 
aim to resolve disputes, arbitration does so by pursuing an answer to the question of which party 
is essentially in the right in the disagreement according to statutory law, evidence, and the 
judgment of the arbitrator. In contrast, mediation is a proceeding that aims to resolve disputes 
through negotiation and compromise, so no single party comes out of the proceeding entirely 
victorious36.  
Another difference between arbitration and mediation involves the differing roles of 
neutral third parties. In arbitration, a third party arbitrator is selected to hear the details of the 
dispute and then decide on a ruling either in favor or against the plaintiff. As a result, the 
arbitrator carries an immense amount of power over the fate of the parties participating in the 
proceeding. In contrast, a neutral third party in a mediation serves to facilitate communication 
between the two parties in order to “resolve their disagreement on terms they both voluntarily 
accept.”37 As a result of these goals, the third party individual in the mediation process carries 
much less power than an arbitrator. 
                                                          
35 Ibid. 
36 Grenig & Scanza on Arbitration: Understanding Evidence (Part I), 85-96 
37 Ibid. 
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Finally, arbitration is much more formal than mediation38. In arbitration, disputes are 
resolved following methods that are typically premeditated and orderly, often similar to a trial 
court proceeding. However, in mediation, proceedings are much more free-formed and open for 
modification. Overall, because of these differences in these forms of alternative dispute 
resolution, mediation will not be considered in conjunct with arbitration during this analysis. 
Conclusion 
 Arbitration can be very complex, but it is oftentimes viewed as a superb alternative to a 
traditional courtroom trial. Indeed, arbitration clauses offer a wide variety of benefits. Businesses 
especially favor arbitration heavily as a result. However, not all Americans agree that arbitration 
is as fantastic as many businesses claim. Arbitration, when abused, provides businesses with an 
unfair amount of power over their consumers and employees. These facets of arbitration give 
corporations an ability to practically guarantee dispute victory, and they rob the consumer of his 
or her right to a day in court. The benefits and drawbacks of arbitration will be discussed in great 
detail in the following two chapters.  
  
                                                          
38 Repa, Barbara Kate. Arbitration Basics 
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Chapter 2: The Benefits of Arbitration 
Arbitration as an Alternative to Traditional Litigation 
 The characteristics of arbitration proceedings in the United States offer a wide variety of 
advantages to all parties in a dispute. In general, the nature of its process results in arbitration 
being preferable to traditional court proceedings in many aspects. Such aspects that make 
arbitration a preferred alternative to court trials include arbitration’s strengths in efficiency, cost, 
flexibility, simplification, arbitrator expertise, and confidentiality, as well as its tendency to 
mitigate hostility between the parties involved. The many advantages that arbitration offers over 
traditional court litigation likely has contributed to the rising popularity of arbitration as a 
preferred method of dispute resolution over the last few decades. 
 When analyzing the benefits of arbitration in comparison to standard court trial 
processes, one of the key advantages arbitration possesses is the speed at which disputes are 
settled. According to a study by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services, an arbitration 
proceeding lasts approximately 475 days on average from the date of filing to the date a decision 
is made. In contrast, the same study found that a similar case brought to a trial court would take, 
on average, anywhere from one and a half to three years to reach a decision39. Of course, the 
expedience of an arbitration procedure is entirely dependent upon proper arbitration planning to 
ensure for a quick and organized process40, but nonetheless the flexibility of arbitration alone 
gives parties a much greater chance of resolving disputes in a quicker manner. The general 
efficiency advantage that arbitration has over court litigation is also largely attributable to the 
                                                          
39 Repa, Barbara Kate. "Arbitration Pros and Cons." Nolo.com. Accessed September 26, 2016. 
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/arbitration-pros-cons-29807.html. 
40 Wilson, Therese. "Setting Boundaries rather than Imposing Bans: Is it Possible to Regulate Consumer Arbitration 
Clauses to Achieve Fairness for Consumers?" Journal of Consumer Policy 39, no. 3 (09, 2016): 349-364. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10603-016-9322-z. 
http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1811109695?accountid=10141. 
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fact that arbitration normally does not allow motions for summary judgment or motions to 
dismiss, two provisions that are generally permitted in trial courts41. In addition, the scope of 
discovery, a phase in a lawsuit in which each party seeks evidence to make their case, is much 
more restricted in arbitration42. These limitations placed on the discovery process also result in 
greater efficiency. Overall, the speed in which disputes in arbitration are settled is perhaps one of 
the greatest advantages this form of alternative dispute resolution offers over traditional 
litigation.  
 The second largest advantage arbitration possesses over the pursuance of lawsuits by trial 
is the fact that arbitration is, more often than not, much cheaper than taking a case to court43. 
Lesser costs are most likely attributable to the fact that the process takes much less time to reach 
a verdict. However, it is important to note that the arbitration process is not always less 
expensive than litigation. Due to the rising popularity of arbitration, its settlement process is 
actually becoming more expensive44. In addition, if an arbitration is not well structured, it may 
end up being costlier than traditional litigation45. Nevertheless, arbitration is generally 
considered a less expensive alternative to the plaintiff’s standard “day in court” and as a result 
should be considered a key factor in arbitration’s tendency to be preferable over other dispute 
resolution options.  
 The flexibility of arbitration proceedings also offers key benefits for both parties involved 
in a dispute. Arbitration, unlike courtroom trials that are subject to the courtrooms’ and judges’ 
                                                          
41 Fojo, Robert. "12 Reasons Businesses Should Use Arbitration Agreements." LawGives. April 1, 2015. Accessed 
November 3, 2016. https://www.lawgives.com/guide/551c5a687777773fa5160200/12-Reasons-Businesses-Should-
Use-Arbitration-Agreements. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Repa, Barbara Kate. Arbitration Pros and Cons 
44 Ibid. 
45 Wilson, Therese. Setting Boundaries rather than Imposing Bans: Is it Possible to Regulate Consumer Arbitration 
Clauses to Achieve Fairness for Consumers? 
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crowded schedules46, can be planned around the needs and availabilities of the parties involved47. 
It is incredibly easy to see why those participating in arbitration would prefer it to a courtroom 
trial when considering this element of flexibility: any reasonable person would likely prefer 
settling a dispute when it is most convenient for them.  
 Additionally, the fact that arbitration generally has more simplified rules of evidence and 
procedure when compared to courtroom litigation is a key advantage. In general, procedure and 
evidence rules are often very complicated in court proceedings48. As a result of the large quantity 
of evidence rules in a trial court, oftentimes a case cannot even be presented in its entirety49. 
Arbitration is not subject to these rules, and as a result, arbitrators are much more likely to permit 
all relevant evidence50. The disparity between rules of evidence and procedure in arbitration and 
in a courtroom make arbitration all the more preferable for parties that wish to put forward as 
best a case as possible to achieve a ruling in their favor. These simplified rules also likely 
contribute to the efficiency advantage that was mentioned previously: Evidential and procedural 
rules being tailored to the needs of those involved in arbitration51 likely leads to a quicker 
arbitration process.  
 Also important to mention when discussing the benefits of arbitration is the fact that there 
is often much less hostility between the parties involved in the dispute during proceedings. 
According to Barbara Kate Repa, it is more likely in arbitration that parties “work together 
peaceably rather than escalate their angst and hostility.”52 The absence of hostility is much less 
                                                          
46 Fojo, Robert. 12 Reasons Businesses Should Use Arbitration Agreements 
47 Repa, Barbara Kate. Arbitration Pros and Cons 
48 Fojo, Robert. 12 Reasons Businesses Should Use Arbitration Agreements 
49 Smith, Stephen. "Why Arbitration Remains the Better Option." Greenberg Glusker. September 2011. Accessed 
November 3, 2016. http://www.greenbergglusker.com/news/articles/Why-arbitration-remains-the-better-option. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Repa, Barbara Kate. Arbitration Pros and Cons 
52 Ibid. 
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common in traditional court proceedings53. This lack of strong aggression between the two 
parties in a dispute is likely because arbitration demands much more cooperation54.  
 Finally, both parties to a dispute generally prefer arbitration because of the fact that they 
have more of a say in choosing the individual(s) that will oversee their proceeding. The ability of 
the parties to choose their arbitrator(s) allows for the recruitment of individuals with a particular 
subject matter expertise55 in order to ensure that the best decision is reached. This notion is 
certainly an advantage over courtroom rulings that are decided by randomly assigned judges and 
juries56 that are potentially under informed about the subject matter at hand. Overall, the 
opportunity to select an arbitrator that best suits a particular case is a key factor that makes 
arbitration more preferable to the parties in a dispute. However, as will be discussed later, this 
aspect of arbitration can be abused if parties select individuals that are more likely to make 
biased decisions. Nonetheless, the freedom of arbitrator selection makes the arbitration process 
much more preferable than a courtroom trial.  
 The wide variety of advantages that arbitration offers over courtroom litigation causes 
both consumers and businesses alike to prefer arbitration, and for a good reason. Because 
arbitration is generally faster, less expensive, more flexible, more simplified, less hostile, and 
more accommodating to the specific needs of a case, businesses and consumers both have plenty 
of reasons to be in favor of arbitration. However, these same benefits also provide businesses 
with the opportunity to abuse the arbitration process, leading to a whole additional collection of 
reasons why companies in particular prefer to settle disputes through arbitration. The potential to 
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abuse an arbitration proceeding in order to obtain a favorable judgment is, ultimately, what 
causes arbitration to become harmful to the consumer. All of these points will be discussed in 
much greater detail as this analysis continues.  
Why Businesses Especially Love Arbitration 
 Companies favor this alternative method of dispute resolution for all of the reasons 
mentioned in the previous section, but they also favor arbitration because arbitration favors them. 
The nature of arbitration often leads to favorable results for businesses. For this reason, it is no 
wonder that arbitration is becoming an increasingly popular alternative to trial proceedings: 
certain facets of arbitration often provide businesses with the opportunity to take steps to 
increase the likelihood of an arbitration ruling in their favor. As a result, companies are largely 
incentivized to insert arbitration clauses into their contractual agreements. Many factors 
contribute to arbitration’s tendency to favor and protect businesses, which in turn causes 
businesses to largely prefer arbitration to standard court litigation. These factors include 
arbitration’s tendency to be confidential, low-risk, and predictable. In addition, a huge factor that 
leads businesses to favor arbitration when settling disputes is the fact that arbitration tends to 
honor additional elements of arbitration clauses, such as class action waivers, that would not 
typically be honored in a trial court. A combination of all of these factors causes arbitration to be 
incredibly business-friendly and therefore recommended for corporations looking to mitigate 
litigation risk. 
 Perhaps one of the most important aspects of arbitration from a business perspective is 
the fact that proceedings are typically deemed private. Such an element of confidentiality serves 
to protect businesses in a way that traditional court proceedings cannot. Privacy is required either 
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by the arbitration’s procedural rules57, or by an agreement of the parties that is typically found in 
the arbitration clause58. Keeping the details of an arbitration out of the public eye is immensely 
beneficial for the corporations involved in disputes because this privacy gives companies the 
opportunity to protect their reputation and minimize public scrutiny of their business practices59. 
This protection is especially important for companies involved in employee or consumer 
disputes, as the details of these types of cases could reflect poorly on the corporation. Because of 
this confidentiality emphasis, it is in a business’s best interest to move forward with arbitration in 
lieu of traditional litigation. 
 Arbitration overall is a much less risky form of dispute settlement60. Companies favor 
arbitration proceedings over trial hearings much more frequently as a result. Such a lessening of 
a business’s exposure to risk is mostly because a company has much less to lose in arbitration 
than in court if a final ruling is not made in their favor. One reason for this lesser risk is the fact 
that punitive damages are rarely included in arbitration awards61. Punitive damages are, 
essentially, damages in excess of simple compensation that are rewarded to further punish the 
wrongdoer and deter others from committing similar wrongs62. A lack of potential punitive 
damage payment provides a corporation with the assurance that, even if it loses a case, the costs 
of the obligatory award payments still will not be incredibly excessive.  Based on this 
information, it makes intuitive sense that corporations favor arbitration. From a business 
perspective, a preference for arbitration can certainly be expected when considering the large 
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disparity between the financial risks involved in trial court proceedings compared to those in 
arbitration.  
 Another key reason why businesses especially prefer to arbitrate when faced with a 
dispute is the fact that it is generally easier to predict how substantive law will be applied in an 
arbitration hearing63. As mentioned in the previous chapter, arbitrators are not required to strictly 
follow the law when making a decision on a dispute. However, according to Stephen Smith, 
arbitrators actually are more likely than court judges to correctly follow the law. Smith states that 
arbitrators are more likely to make a lawfully correct ruling due to the fact that arbitrators—
unlike trial judges—are paid for their time, are capable of taking ample time to make a proper 
decision, and are more qualified in business and civil law64. Smith actually advises business to 
insert arbitration clauses into their contracts for this reason, among others.  
 Also an incredibly important element of arbitration that must be mentioned is the fact that 
it often enables class action waivers. A class action, essentially, is a proceeding in which 
individuals who lose small amounts of money due to a company’s violation of their rights are 
able to join together to seek relief and hold businesses liable for wrongdoing65. A person with a 
small claim is not likely to pursue a case alone because the cost of litigation, even through 
arbitration, typically is much greater than the maximum possible recovery amount of his or her 
claim. For this reason, class actions allow these small claim holders to still be capable of 
pursuing justice. Said justice can, however, be obstructed with a class action waiver. A class 
action waiver is a contractual term that prohibits the consumers and workers that agree to it from 
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bringing or participating in a class action against the corporation to which they are contracted66. 
The enforcement of class action waivers is a major reason for businesses to adopt arbitration 
clauses in their contracts because it essentially allows a firm to become immune to harmful class 
action litigation. 
Class action waivers often result in a plaintiff’s abandonment of his or her claim 
altogether. Because the cost to take a dispute to court or arbitration typically is much greater than 
the value of a plaintiff’s small claim, a majority of consumers and workers bound by class action 
waivers choose to just take their losses and capitulate. For example, research conducted by the 
New York Times found that, between 2010 and 2014, only 505 consumers went to arbitration 
over a dispute of $2500 or less67. Drawing back upon the AAA statistic from the previous 
chapter that stated that their firm handles over 2 million arbitrations per year, this is an 
alarmingly miniscule number of small claims. Based on this data, one can conclude that most 
consumers with small claims that were barred from pursuing a class action simply chose not to 
move forward with their cases. A plaintiff’s tendency to opt out of litigation due to a class action 
waiver is fantastic from a business perspective: Because businesses are able to limit consumers 
and employees to pursuing claims solely on an individual basis, they are able to mitigate a 
massive amount of litigation risk that typically coincides with class action lawsuits. Such a 
protection over corporate disputes certainly incentivizes businesses to pursue arbitration instead 
of a jury trial, where class action waivers are not enforced.  
Finally, businesses typically favor arbitration because arbitration typically favors 
businesses. For one, the rules and the arbitrators in arbitration tend to favor corporations. 
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Because arbitrators often view the company that is a party to an arbitration proceeding as their 
“client”, it is common that an arbitration ruling will favor the business over the consumer68. The 
implications of such a bias in arbitration will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.  
Overall, arbitration stands as potentially the best option for settling disputes from a 
corporate perspective. Based on the large quantity of benefits that arbitration has to offer, 
particularly to businesses, it is easy to see why. Because companies especially benefit from the 
confidentiality, risk mitigation, arbitrator expertise, and predictability of arbitration, it is no 
wonder that most corporations are advised to insert arbitration clauses into their contracts in 
order to mitigate legal risk69. Class action waivers and the tendency for arbitration to favor 
businesses especially explains why companies favor arbitration over courtroom trials.   
Conclusion 
 Overall, arbitration as a method of dispute resolution offers a wide variety of benefits to 
the consumer and the corporation alike. The nature of these proceedings is especially 
advantageous to businesses, who can greatly mitigate their legal risk by choosing to arbitrate. 
Unfortunately, the same cannot necessarily be said for consumers and employees involved in the 
arbitration process. At the very least, it is clear from this discussion that arbitration should be a 
preferred method of dispute resolution because of the elements of efficiency, cost reduction, 
flexibility, and simplification that arbitrations offer to both sides of a disagreement. Indeed, 
arbitration overall is much more beneficial than court litigation for many reasons, especially 
from the perspective of the corporation. Unfortunately, anything that has pros also has cons. 
                                                          
68 Silver-Greenberg, Jessica, and Michael Corkery. "In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System’." 
Compiled by Robert Gebeloff. The New York Times, November 2, 2015. October 1, 2015. Accessed September 26, 
2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-
system.html. 
69 Fojo, Robert. 12 Reasons Businesses Should Use Arbitration Agreements 
26 
 
Whether or not the disadvantages of arbitration, especially from the consumer perspective, 
outweigh these aforementioned advantages will be investigated in the subsequent chapter.  
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Chapter 3: The Shortcomings of Arbitration 
 It is clear from the previous chapter’s discussion that arbitration does offer a wide variety 
of benefits over the traditional courtroom trial for all parties involved in a dispute. At the very 
least, these advantages justify the necessity of honoring arbitration as a valid form of dispute 
resolution in America’s justice system. However, many of the benefits of arbitration greatly 
favor businesses over the everyday consumer or employee that is bound by an arbitration clause. 
As a result of this corporate favoritism, legal advisors typically recommend that businesses insert 
arbitration clauses into their contractual agreements. Unfortunately, in spite of the 
aforementioned benefits of arbitration, these clauses do not always stand to benefit the party on 
the other side of a business agreement. The fact that arbitration can deny consumers and 
employees of their fundamental rights serves as a major shortcoming of this form of alternative 
dispute resolution. 
 The reality of the traditionally business-friendly arbitration process is that it is incredibly 
unfair for consumers and employees looking to seek remedies from businesses. In arbitration, 
customers and workers alike often do not stand a chance against major businesses because 
corporations often possess a disproportionate amount of power over arbitration proceedings. This 
power allows a dispute to be settled in a way that harms the company involved as little as 
possible. This unequal balance of power can be attributed to a variety of factors, such as the fact 
that parties are often forced to agree to terms on a “take it or leave it” basis or are not aware that 
they are bound by an arbitration clause.  The unjust nature of arbitration from a consumer 
perspective is also partially due to the fact that arbitration decisions are often subject to arbitrator 
biases. The ability of corporations to demand confidentiality during proceedings additionally 
serves to unfairly protect businesses from “harmful” litigation. As if the above disadvantages 
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from the consumer perspective were not enough, the chances of a consumer obtaining a fair 
ruling become even slimmer when considering the rising popularity of bootstrapping in 
arbitration clauses. Bootstrapping will be further defined later in this chapter. As a result of 
arbitration’s tendency to favor businesses, consumers and employees often get the short end of 
the stick when a decision is made. Considering the fact that it is practically impossible to appeal 
an arbitrator’s decision, it currently appears that nearly every facet of the arbitration process is 
stacked up against the consumer.  
Being business-friendly, arbitration currently stands as “a way to circumvent the courts 
and bar people from joining together in class action lawsuits,” which prevents citizens from 
“[fighting] illegal and deceitful business practices.”70 The effects and implications of this 
massive consumer disadvantage in arbitration are vast, unjust, and incredibly troublesome. While 
arbitration does stand as an alternative form of dispute resolution that offers many advantages 
over traditional courtroom trials, the process’s shortcomings from the consumer and employee 
perspective are unacceptable and must be addressed. Best said by Boston Federal Judge, William 
G. Young, “business has a good chance of opting out of the legal system altogether and 
misbehaving without reproach”71 as arbitration exists currently.  
Surprise! You are bound by an Arbitration Clause! 
 Perhaps the most horrific characteristic of arbitration clauses is the fact that most 
consumers and workers are not even aware that they are bound by them until it is too late. The 
consumer’s typical lack of awareness in this regard is attributable to the fact that there exists 
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today a general consumer ignorance of the “fine print” in contracts. Even if consumers or 
workers do not wish to be bound by arbitration clauses, oftentimes the contracts that contain 
them are presented to consumers on a “take it or leave it” basis, and as a result, buyers have no 
choice but to agree to all the terms. The fact that consumers are either unaware of what they have 
agreed to or incapable of doing anything to avoid arbitration clauses has enabled greater 
corporate control over arbitration proceedings. Because consumers have no choice but to be 
bound by the arbitration clauses they agree to, whether knowingly or not, corporations are able to 
engineer arbitration terms that practically guarantee that they will come out of an arbitration 
proceeding unscathed and victorious.  
 When a contract is presented to a party on a “take it or leave it” basis, it is known as a 
contract of adhesion72. The ability of adhesion contracts to bind consumers to arbitration in the 
event of a dispute serves as a major limitation of arbitration clauses from the consumer 
perspective. Adhesion contracts create an incredibly uneven playing field in the realm of 
contractual negotiation73. When a contract is presented on a “take it or leave it” basis, consumers 
have no choice but to agree to the included arbitration clause, no matter how unfairly the 
arbitration’s terms have been engineered to facilitate corporate victory. Consumers are then left 
to choose between agreeing to proceed in unfair arbitration and abandoning the agreement 
altogether, practically guaranteeing that corporations will be able to successfully create 
arbitration clauses that yield rulings in their favor.  Jessica Silver-Greenberg describes this 
dilemma best in her New York Times article: “For many people, when the choice is between 
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giving up the right to go to court or the chance to get a job, it is not a choice at all.”74 
Unfortunately, most contracts between businesses and consumers and between employers and 
employees are contracts of adhesion75. As a result, one can infer that many of the consumers and 
workers that are compelled to settle disputes through arbitration due to previous arbitration 
agreements were not voluntarily agreeing to arbitrate in the first place. The court’s tendency to 
demand that these fundamentally nonconsensual arbitration agreements be honored certainly 
serves as a drawback to the arbitration process as it currently exists.  
 Whether a contract is presented to a consumer on a “take it or leave it” basis or not, many 
consumers are not even aware that arbitration clauses exist in the agreements they sign. In many 
cases, individuals have not knowingly consented to arbitrate disputes arising out of their 
contracts76. Especially in a time when electronic contracts are becoming much more 
commonplace, an unfortunate truth is that many Americans no longer take the time to read 
through the terms of a contract before signing it. Recent empirical research highlighted by 
Therese Wilson “has confirmed the general lack of both awareness of, and understanding of, 
arbitration clauses…by consumers.”77 As a result, many individuals are not aware that they are 
forfeiting their right to a jury trial by agreeing to an unfair arbitration clause. This unfortunate 
truth only exacerbates the problem of unfair arbitration. 
 American ignorance of this growing problem provides an opportunity for businesses to 
exploit arbitration clauses even further. According to F. Paul Bland Jr., “the sharp shift away 
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from the civil justice system has barely registered with Americans,” because the “tangle of bans” 
inside arbitration clauses have been inserted into contracts that no one reads in the first place78. 
Based on this information, one can infer that it must be quite easy to manipulate the system if the 
parties that are most affected by wrongdoing are not even aware that they are being wronged. 
Even when consumers do read contractual terms before signing, oftentimes they are not aware 
what they are agreeing to by accepting the terms of an arbitration clause. Consumer rights lawyer 
Jane Santoni herself admits that she has “never met a client who’s understood what the word 
arbitration clause meant.”79 As a result, consumers and employees oftentimes sign away their 
fundamental courtroom rights simply because they do not know any better.  
Unfortunately, the courts still mandate arbitration to the same degree whether or not the 
plaintiff knew what they were agreeing to when he or she signed their contract. Even if a 
consumer had no choice but to agree to all the terms of a contract, the courts still fully enforce 
arbitration clauses. This fact is a fundamental shortcoming of arbitration. Santoni herself claims 
that “if they put in the contract ‘you are waiving a constitutional right,’ that would get people’s 
attention…but they don’t say that.”80 She makes an interesting point here. If preventing 
consumer exploitation is as easy as re-writing contractual elements in non-technical language to 
facilitate better understanding, the courts should not be forcing consumers into arbitration simply 
because they were not aware that they were surrendering their trial rights. Overall, it does not 
seem fair that citizens are able to waive their rights in this way without actually comprehending 
what they are agreeing to. In the spirit of justice, the courts appear overbearing in forcing 
consumers to arbitrate when they have unintentionally waived their rights. Doing so establishes 
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the notion that the courts tend to favor businesses in this realm of dispute settlement, which 
offers a large opportunity for further consumer exploitation.   
Arbitrator Bias 
Arbitration tends to favor businesses over consumers in part because of the frequent 
presence of arbitrator bias during proceedings. The potential for favoritism in these decision 
makers serves as a significant shortcoming of arbitration. Arbitrator bias most likely exists as a 
threat to the arbitration process because the proceedings do not have any strict rules that prevent 
conflicts of interest among arbitrators81. While certain arbitration firms may prohibit conflicts of 
interest, no hard and fast rule currently exists that bans arbitrator bias in all arbitration 
proceedings. Because there are no restrictions in place to prevent the selection of biased 
arbitrators, companies are much more able to select decision makers that are more inclined to 
rule in their favor. As a result, arbitrators also have a greater incentive to rule in the favor of a 
business that can subsequently hire them for future arbitration hearings. Overall, this ever-
present threat of arbitrator bias serves as one of the reasons consumers and workers come up 
short in most arbitration hearings. 
Opportunities for arbitrator bias arise in part because the arbitrator is largely at will to 
dictate the nature of his or her arbitration proceeding. For example, arbitrators are  “largely at 
liberty to determine how much evidence a plaintiff can present and how much the defense can 
withhold,”82 meaning that they possess the power to make decisions regarding evidence in favor 
of businesses if they so wish. In addition, the fact that arbitrators are able to make decisions 
based on their own judgment without being as tightly bound by the rule of law, which was 
discussed previously, allows arbitrators the opportunity to favor corporations when making a 
                                                          
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
33 
 
final decision. For example, religious institutions with arbitration clauses can demand an 
arbitration process with an arbitrator that is guided by the rules of the Bible instead of by state or 
federal law83, which allows those businesses to control the legal outcomes of disputes by using 
first amendment freedoms of religion. Few courts have intervened on this issue of religious 
arbitration84, and this is merely one example of the freedoms that arbitrators may take when 
attempting to reach a verdict. Essentially, the absence of arbitration regulation from the decision-
making perspective allows arbitrators to have the freedom to make non-neutral decisions if they 
wish.  
The biggest reason that arbitrator bias stands to threaten the fairness and neutrality of the 
arbitration process is the fact that arbitrators have developed a tendency to rule in favor of the 
businesses that hire them85. Based on the fact that a New York Times study of arbitration records 
indicated that, between 2010 and 2014, a total of forty-one arbitrators had each handled ten or 
more cases for a single company86, it is clear that arbitrators receive more “repeat clients” when 
they rule in favor of a business during a dispute. While it is understandable why arbitrators may 
wish to develop a favorable relationship with a company in order to obtain more opportunities to 
oversee future arbitration proceedings, these biases rob the plaintiff of his or her right to an 
impartial trial. Unfortunately, even if an arbitrator feels morally inclined to make an unbiased 
decision, he or she often cannot without fear of losing business for their arbitration firm87. For 
example, in interviews conducted between arbitrators and the New York Times, more than three 
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dozen arbitrators claimed that they felt “beholden” to companies during proceedings88. Such a 
statistic becomes even more alarming when considering personal accounts from arbitrators, like 
Stefan M. Manson, who ruled in favor of an employee in an age discrimination suit and was 
subsequently never hired to hear another employment case89.  Clearly, even if an arbitrator 
wishes to decide without bias, achieving a victory over a corporation can be next to impossible.  
From a business standpoint, it is understandable why arbitrators may feel pressure to 
decide in favor of a corporation. After all, arbitration firms are private entities whose success is 
dependent upon whether or not they are hired to conduct arbitration hearings. Because typical 
business success is often determined by a company’s ability to keep its customers happy and 
recurring, it is no wonder why arbitration bias is posing such a problem: It is practically 
necessary in order to keep the arbitration firm in business. Considering the fact that companies 
often specify in their contracts the firm that will exclusively handle their arbitrations90, it is even 
easier to see why arbitrators become incentivized to decide in favor of businesses in order to 
keep their own arbitration firms successful. These incentives, coupled with the fact that 
arbitrators are not required to specify the reasons for their decisions91 and the fact that it is very 
difficult to appeal an arbitrator’s ruling92, practically guarantee defeat for employees and 
consumers.  
Overall, the incentives and opportunities for biased decision making that exist within the 
arbitration process pose a great threat to the achievement of a fair ruling in the settlement of a 
dispute. These biases, in combination with the other shortcomings of arbitration that will be 
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discussed subsequently, make it nearly impossible for a consumer to benefit from the arbitration 
process.  
Protecting the Corporation, Ignoring the Consumer 
 Without yet having even fully discussed all the ways in which arbitration favors the 
corporate world, it is already easy to see that consumers and employees begin the arbitration 
process at an incredibly unfair disadvantage. While to a certain extent one can argue that 
corporations are merely taking advantage of what is available to them in the dispute resolution 
process, there is something to be said about arbitration’s tendency to favor businesses. The very 
nature of arbitration as it currently exists practically guarantees a corporate victory. Even in the 
off chance that a plaintiff triumphs against a corporation, privacy restrictions still ensure that 
companies suffer minimal reputational damage from a hearing. This unfair protection is another 
shortcoming of arbitration in the fact that it unfairly supports the corporate party in a proceeding 
even in the event of a loss. 
 Confidentiality, while noted previously as a positive aspect of the arbitration process, also 
can serve as a drawback if it results in a corporation not being rightfully punished or exposed for 
wrongdoing. To draw back upon what was discussed previously, corporations essentially are able 
to ensure that arbitration be conducted privately and confidentially simply by inserting the 
requirement into their arbitration clauses. This is incredibly beneficial for businesses because it 
allows them to protect their reputations. However, it must be noted that the court’s enforcement 
of arbitration confidentiality requirements may rob consumers all over the world of information 
that is important for their well-being. As pointed out by Jessica Silver-Greenberg, “thousands of 
cases brought by single plaintiffs over fraud, wrongful death, and rape are now being decided 
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behind closed doors.”93 Keeping information that is this important for consumer safety purposes 
behind closed doors only serves to place future consumers in harm’s way. The element of 
privacy within arbitration especially is a limitation of this form of alternative dispute resolution 
because it becomes even more difficult for anyone to tell if the proceedings are conducted fairly 
if the proceedings are kept confidential94. As a result, unfairness due to factors such as arbitrator 
bias or the use of adhesion contracts will not be noticed by the public and therefore will not be 
addressed or reviewed by courts. Even further, because the Federal Government does not require 
any sort of public reporting for arbitration, such a lack of consumer protection remains a problem 
even without specified confidentiality requirements. Overall, the unshakable confidentiality of 
the arbitration process may actually be more of a drawback than a benefit.  
Bootstrapping 
 Arbitration is bad enough for the consumer without even considering bootstrapping. As if 
arbitrator bias, adhesion contracts, inconspicuous arbitration clauses, and arbitration 
confidentiality were not enough to mitigate a business’s legal risks at the expense of the worker 
or consumer, bootstrapping stands as a lesser-known but equally powerful way for corporations 
to protect themselves through arbitration. The legal term “bootstrapping,” was coined by UCI 
Law Professor Christopher R. Leslie. According to Professor Leslie, it essentially is a situation 
where firms insert terms that are actually unrelated to arbitration into their arbitration clauses “in 
the hopes that judges will be more likely to enforce terms embedded in arbitration clauses.”95 
Many of these terms that are inserted into arbitration clauses are, on their own, considered 
legally unconscionable in many states, and therefore unenforceable. However, according to 
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Professor Leslie, many courts enforce the same unconscionable terms when they are inserted into 
arbitration clauses96. Examples of such unconscionable terms will be highlighted later in this 
section. Recent rulings made by the United States Supreme Court further support the 
enforceability of unconscionable terms that are included in arbitration clauses, making the odds 
of consumer justice in arbitration even slimmer.  
 Bootstrapping appears to be one of the largest threats to maintaining arbitration fairness. 
Standing as the corporation’s most flexible tool to protect itself from harmful litigation, 
bootstrapping and the Federal Court’s treatment of it is one of the most harmful shortcomings of 
arbitration. Without the protection of the states to ensure fair treatment for consumers and 
employees during arbitration, businesses are free to unfairly engineer arbitration clauses to 
minimize the already miniscule damages they might suffer due to dispute settlements.  
 Before proceeding, it is important to mention that the majority of research that has been 
conducted on bootstrapping was performed and analyzed by Professor Christopher Leslie. While 
this section of discussion draws mainly from Professor Leslie’s work, this issue of bootstrapping 
and the implications of its enforceability in the American judicial system are incredibly 
important to consumer and employee rights and to the nature of arbitration as a whole. Overall, 
though the problem of bootstrapping can be said to be just one man’s opinion, it is an opinion 
that has great merit and is worth considering extensively in the context of this analysis.  
I. The Rise of Bootstrapping 
 Over the past few decades, the policies of the American justice system have evolved to 
favor arbitration97. Such an evolution was catalyzed by two Supreme Court decisions that 
effectively set a tone for arbitration-friendly rulings that have been subsequently echoed by the 
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lower courts. The Supreme Court decisions in AT&T Mobility LLC vs. Concepcion (2011) and 
American Express Co. vs. Italian Colors Restaurant (2013) together have paved the way for a 
more universal enforceability of arbitration clauses, no matter their terms. Each of these 
decisions draws upon the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) that was previously described in this 
paper. In response to these decisions, according to Professor Leslie, “firms are harnessing the 
reasoning of these opinions in order to insert a variety of unconscionable contract terms into 
arbitration clauses.”98 What’s worse, the courts are letting them. 
 Before delving into the details of the above court cases, it is important to define a few 
important concepts that are relevant to these decisions. First, one cannot understand the dangers 
of bootstrapping without first understanding unconscionability.  Unconscionability is an element 
of contract law—and, therefore, state law—that demands that the terms of a contract be 
considered unenforceable if they contain unconscionable terms99. The Law Dictionary states that 
a term is unconscionable if it is “so unfair to a party that no reasonable or informed person would 
agree to it.”100 These contractual terms can be deemed as either substantively or procedurally 
unconscionable. Substantive unconscionability applies if the actual terms of the contract are 
unconscionable, while procedural unconscionability applies when the process by which the 
contract is made is deemed unconscionable101. State contract law ordinarily deems 
unconscionable contracts and unconscionable contract terms unenforceable, but recent Supreme 
Court decisions have undermined this unconscionability defense102. 
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 Also important to understand when analyzing the aforementioned cases is the Effective 
Vindication Doctrine. This arbitration-specific doctrine essentially provides that one cannot 
compel arbitration if the proceedings rob the plaintiff of his or her statutory rights103. It was 
created by the Supreme Court as a way to ensure that arbitration “remains a real method of 
dispute resolution.”104 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s recent rulings in favor of business-
friendly arbitration have given companies a greater incentive to insert waivers of statutory rights 
into their arbitration clauses because said decisions have inherently undermined the Effective 
Vindication Doctrine in the same way that they have undermined the unconscionability defense.  
  When considering elements of unconscionability and the Effective Vindication Doctrine, 
it is natural to wonder how items once rendered unenforceable become acceptable when they are 
found within an arbitration clause. The main answer to this question is found by examining the 
Supreme Court’s evolution of its interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) over the 
past few decades. As was mentioned in this paper’s previous overview of the FAA, the Act was 
passed by Congress in 1925 because arbitration was viewed to possess a variety of advantages 
over traditional litigation.  However, it is crucial to this paper’s examination of the FAA to 
mention that, according to Professor Christopher Leslie, the 1925 Congress that successfully 
passed this legislation was solely concerned with arbitration proceedings for disputes between 
merchants105. As we know from this paper’s previous discussion of arbitration, this merchant 
exclusivity in the proceedings no longer exists. In fact, it seems as though the most popular use 
of arbitration these days is for disputes between consumers and businesses or employees and 
their employers. This shift is likely because businesses realized that they could better mitigate 
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their legal risk by inserting arbitration clauses into contracts with consumers and employees, and 
because the Supreme Court began allowing it. With that being said, the broadening of 
arbitration’s reach to include these additional parties since the FAA’s creation in 1925 is 
primarily because of the fact that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Arbitration 
Act has evolved significantly over the years. In particular, the Supreme Court’s understanding of 
Section 2 of the FAA has allowed arbitration to become more applicable to non-merchant 
parties106. Section two states: 
A written provision in…a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle 
by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction…shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.107  
According to Professor Leslie, the Supreme Court interprets this part of the Act to mean that the 
FAA overrides any state law that prohibits arbitration for any reason108. This interpretation is the 
primary reason that bootstrapping has become such a problem for consumers: because the 
Supreme Court asserts that the FAA allows for it. According to Professor Leslie, the Supreme 
Court’s allowance for the expanding reach of arbitration clauses “fundamentally undermines the 
expansive body of state and federal law designed to protect consumer and worker interests.”109 
Based on this opinion, it is possible that this shifting interpretation is the primary reason for why 
consumer rights are consistently being violated by the now business-friendly nature of 
arbitration. At the very least, it is important to note that the results of this FAA interpretation 
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often violate the seventh amendment to the Constitution, which preserves the citizen’s right to a 
jury trial110. This right disappears when parties are forced into arbitration.  
 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA began to change in 1980s111. At that 
point, the Court began to argue that the 1925 Congress intended that the FAA create a “federal 
policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution”112 and for the FAA to preempt state laws113 so that 
arbitration would be enforced according to its terms. Since then, the Court has issued over a 
dozen arbitration-friendly opinions similar to the one mentioned above114. The development of 
this “regime where the legal claims of consumers and employees must be decided in private 
arbitration”115 instead of court is best exemplified through an examination of two particular 
Supreme Court rulings.  
 The case of AT&T Mobility LLC vs. Concepcion in 2011 resulted in a decision that 
spearheaded arbitration’s transformation into a process that is harmful to the consumer. Vincent 
and Liza Concepcion, who were seeking class action treatment regarding an unfair $30 charge 
from AT&T for what was supposed to be a free cell phone, brought the case to a California 
court116. The couple had signed an adhesion contract containing an arbitration clause with a class 
action waiver, which the state of California did not consider enforceable. After the California 
Supreme Court ruled not to honor the class action waiver, the case made its way to the United 
States Supreme Court. The Court held that the FAA preempted any state laws that made class 
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action waivers unenforceable117, and, therefore, the California ban on class action waivers did 
not apply. As a result, corporations were essentially given the green light to insert class action 
bans into their contractual arbitration clauses.  
 This decision had many troublesome implications. For one, it essentially gave the “OK” 
to firms that wanted to insert otherwise unconscionable terms into their contracts, as long as 
those terms were included within the arbitration clause. This decision was a major setback for 
consumers and workers alike. While this Supreme Court ruling primarily focused upon class 
action waivers, it can be argued that this decision paved the way for an even greater 
enforceability of a wide variety of unconscionable clauses due to the fact that even more 
business-friendly decisions regarding this issue have been made subsequent to this case. The 
decision, by limiting the ability of courts to render elements of a contract unenforceable due to 
their unconscionability118, practically encourages firms to engineer arbitration clauses that will 
allow them to overstep statutes put in place by states to protect consumers and employees. As the 
following Supreme Court ruling will indicate, this Concepcion decision galvanized arbitration 
clauses to demand business-friendly arbitration. The drawbacks of this class action waiver 
endorsement will be discussed later in this section.  
 The second case that was fundamental in the rise of bootstrapping is the American 
Express Co. vs. Italian Colors Restaurant case that took place in 2013. The people of Italian 
Colors brought a case against American Express claiming that the bank had violated antitrust 
laws. Unfortunately, the restaurant had entered contracts with American Express that contained 
class action waivers, and it went to court to seek class-wide relief. Similar to the previously 
discussed Concepcion ruling, the Supreme Court responded to this class action request by ruling 
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that “a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under the FAA,” even when “the 
plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential 
recovery.”119 This decision was yet another major loss for consumers and a major win for 
businesses because it further demonstrated the Court’s acceptance of class action waivers within 
arbitration clauses. This business-friendly ruling served to further protect corporations because it 
provided them the ability to further shield themselves from harmful litigation due to class 
actions. This protection is especially helpful in mitigating a firm’s legal risk because consumers 
are much less likely to pursue a small claim individually because the cost for them to arbitrate on 
their own often is larger than the small claim for which they are seeking remedy. Professor 
Christopher Leslie believes that the combination of the above Supreme Court decisions in the 
Concepcion and Italian Colors cases served to dismantle “entire fields of law.”120 Such a 
disintegration of former policies put in place for consumer and employee protection allows 
corporations to obtain even more power over their customers and workers in litigation.  
 The Supreme Court rulings in the Concepcion and Italian Colors cases served to be 
major setbacks for proponents of class action protection for consumers. In the years following 
these decisions, a number of similar rulings in favor of class action waivers have been issued in 
the Supreme Court, as well as in lower courts across the country121. The corporation’s ability to 
protect itself from class action litigation with the use of arbitration clauses serves to practically 
ensure their dispute victory, whether individual consumers choose to continue pursuing their 
claims or not. In addition to bringing about the end of class action protection, these rulings 
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together with the Supreme Court’s new general interpretation of the reach of the FAA carry with 
them the potential for a new enforceability of other unconscionable contract terms bootstrapped 
to arbitration clauses. After all, if the courts are willing to dismantle a consumer’s fundamental 
right to a jury trial even in the event of a small claim, it is certainly plausible that more statutory 
consumer protections will soon be rendered ineffective as well. Forcing arbitration that 
fundamentally undermines the consumer’s right to the pursuance of justice makes the 
corporation practically invincible as a result. This mandatory arbitration, in the words of the 
Legislative Director for the National Association of Consumer Advocates, Christine Hines, 
allows for “big businesses [to write] all the rules. It shields companies from being held 
accountable for bad practices.”122 Hines makes an excellent point. If bootstrapping eventually 
makes it possible for businesses to mitigate their legal risks through the use of traditionally 
unconscionable terms that make consumer victory virtually impossible, eventually businesses 
will no longer ever be forced to take responsibility for their wrongdoings. Any legal system that 
allows for such a violation of ethical business practices and of fundamentals of consumer 
fairness certainly should be considered a system that is deeply flawed.  
 The effects of this Supreme Court shift in FAA interpretation possess the potential to 
have incredibly dire consequences. According to Professor Leslie, already “firms are harnessing 
the reasoning of these [Concepcion and Italian Colors] opinions in order to insert a variety of 
unconscionable contract terms into arbitration clauses.”123 Even worse, the lower courts are 
following the Federal Court’s lead in deeming these wildly unfair terms enforceable whenever 
they are found within an arbitration clause124. Already, these decisions have led more firms to 
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adopt unfair arbitration clauses. In addition, legal firms are now advising businesses to “manage 
their legal risk in a more effective and predictable fashion by using clear, well-written arbitration 
agreements that prohibit or limit remedies that customers or employees normally pursue in 
court.”125 As a result, mandatory arbitration clauses have come to dominate entire industries126, 
leaving consumers and employees truly without any other choice.  
 The fact that arbitration bootstrapping is already posing a problem to consumers 
nationwide serves to support the fact that the arbitration system as it currently exists is 
fundamentally flawed. Such a notion becomes incredibly troublesome when acknowledging the 
fact that the aforementioned Supreme Court decisions essentially confirm the legality of 
arbitration bootstrapping. Such an egregious ignorance of consumer rights in favor of the 
corporation’s need to protect itself absolutely stands as the greatest limitation of arbitration 
today. Whether or not the courts are correct in mandating bootstrapped arbitration of this nature 
is up for debate, but based upon this analysis thus far it is at the very least obvious that the 
restrictions under which consumers and workers are currently placed with corporate-engineered 
arbitration cannot and should not be tolerated. This stands especially true when considering the 
fact that a majority of consumers and employees bound to arbitration are not even aware that 
they have signed away their rights to a traditional trial, as well as the fact that the Supreme Court 
has forbidden states from requiring firms to provide an upfront notice of arbitration clauses127.  
Because the current nature of arbitration robs the consumer of his or her fundamental right to a 
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fair trial in a wide variety of ways, more legislation over arbitration is necessary in order to 
address the shortcomings of the arbitration process.   
II. The Effects of Bootstrapping Legality 
The Supreme Court’s recent openness to class action waivers within arbitration clauses 
facilitates the corporation’s ability to place even more restrictions upon the consumer with 
arbitration clauses. First and foremost, the ability to dismantle a consumer’s right to the 
pursuance of a class action is absolutely cemented by these decisions and most certainly will 
become more common as time progresses. For example, already another case, DirecTV vs. 
Imburgia, made its way to the Supreme Court in 2015. The case was also questioning the 
enforceability of a class action waiver placed inside an arbitration clause128. Unsurprisingly, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the class action lawsuit could not be pursued129, further confirming the 
enforceability of unconscionable bootstrapped contract terms in arbitration clauses.  
The new honorability of class action waivers poses quite a threat to consumer rights. Class 
action litigation was initially created by Congress “to overcome the problem that small 
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his 
or her own rights.”130 Acting as a way for consumers to band together to seek remedy for these 
small claims, class action lawsuits in the past indeed have succeeded in acting as a solution to 
this problem. Unfortunately, this solution disappears as courts honor class action waivers more 
frequently. If the fix to the previously mentioned problem disappears, one can only infer that the 
problem that had before been solved will soon manifest itself as an issue once again. Following 
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this logic, without the ability to pursue small claims through class actions, it is likely that 
consumers will not have enough incentive to pursue recovery for their relatively small damages 
individually. Consumers and employees that have been wronged by businesses likely will then 
be less motivated to proceed to individual arbitration for a small claim. Professor Leslie points 
out that this decreased incentive is likely because these waivers make arbitration “prohibitively 
expensive for plaintiffs because the expected costs of bringing an individual claim exceed the 
highest possible damages award.”131 Once again, this shows that the Court’s new attitude 
towards arbitration serves to protect businesses. Seeing as a Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) study has already confirmed that 85% of consumer arbitration clauses include 
“no class arbitration provisions” within their terms132, it is clear that this problem is only going to 
get worse.   
It is easy to see why the enforceability of bootstrapped class action waivers serves as a 
fundamental shortcoming of the arbitration process as it exists currently. It should certainly be a 
red flag to lawmakers that arbitration is currently encouraging consumers not to pursue justice. 
Considering the fact that many laws exist to ensure that all citizens have a right to represent 
themselves positively in court, such as the right to an attorney, it can be inferred that this 
obstruction of consumer and worker justice dismantles one of the fundamental goals of the 
American legal system. As arbitration laws currently exist, the chances for wronged individuals 
to obtain recovery seem to become slimmer and slimmer as time passes. Perhaps worst of all, 
this problem will likely only be further exacerbated in the future as more firms realize the 
benefits of insulating themselves from harmful litigation through the use of class action waivers 
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in their arbitration agreements. In fact, according to Barbara Kate Repa, there has already been 
speculation that businesses include arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts mainly so that 
they can also enforce class action waivers133. Overall, it is easy to see that this element of 
arbitration is fundamentally flawed and absolutely should be addressed by lawmakers.  
An additional effect of the Supreme Court’s honoring of class action waivers within 
arbitration clauses is the fact that additional types of unconscionable contract terms can likely be 
made enforceable when included in arbitration clauses. The Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
FAA essentially possesses the power to enable courts to enforce a number of unconscionable 
terms that dismantle consumer rights even further. As a result, businesses are further protected 
from harmful litigation and consumers are further discouraged from pursuing the remedies they 
rightfully deserve. 
Professor Leslie points out a number of contractual elements that businesses can include in 
their arbitration clauses to further engineer arbitration proceedings to work in their favor134. 
Before continuing, it is important to note that each additional contractual term mentioned here 
provides an unfair advantage to businesses so much that they would generally be considered 
unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. However, by inserting these clauses into arbitration 
agreements, businesses are able to potentially obtain even more litigation protection because of 
how courts currently are honoring arbitration agreements. While not all courts honor all of these 
additional terms, many have been known to follow the Supreme Court’s lead by deeming them 
enforceable135. 
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For one, corporations can potentially reduce statutes of limitations in order to more quickly 
close the window of opportunity that consumers and employees have to pursue disputes136. If a 
bootstrapping of this type were deemed honorable by the court, which is certainly possible 
considering that many attorneys are actually advising their businesses to shorten statutes of 
limitations in this way137, consumers and workers would be less likely to obtain the remedies 
they rightfully deserve because they may not file their claims on time. As a result, businesses 
would have yet another way to protect themselves from harmful litigation by use of the 
arbitration clause.  
Second, Professor Leslie notes that businesses may be able to place limitations upon the 
amount of damages that could be awarded through arbitration by utilizing bootstrapping138. 
These limitations would most likely be put in place to prevent the rewarding of damages beyond 
a compensatory amount139. This requirement could serve as another unfair way for businesses to 
protect themselves because it minimizes potential costs while simultaneously discouraging 
consumers from pursuing their individual claims because damage limitations possess the 
potential to make arbitration an even more prohibitive cost for plaintiffs. On a similar note, 
businesses can bootstrap to keep costs of litigation down by including fee-shifting provisions in 
their arbitration clauses140. If these provisions were honored, the party that loses in the dispute 
would have to pay for the arbitration and attorney fees for both parties in the dispute141. As a 
result, individual arbitration once again does not appear very appealing to consumers with 
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smaller claims due to its prohibitive costs that are worsened by this provision. In addition, once 
again businesses are given the opportunity to protect themselves from the law. 
Professor Leslie additionally points out that the inclusion of anti-injunction clauses and 
forum selection clauses in arbitration agreements is often honored by the courts142. The ability 
for businesses to additionally include these provisions serves as another major drawback to the 
arbitration process because it makes it that much more difficult for consumers to pursue the 
remedies that they deserve. Both of these clauses, if deemed enforceable, further equip 
businesses with the tools necessary to ensure that every element of an arbitration proceeding 
works in their favor. By limiting injunctions and enabling themselves to select the forum in 
which arbitration proceeds, corporations are able to further engineer arbitration proceedings by 
preemptively planning them in their arbitration agreements in order to ensure their victory over 
consumers and employees in disputes.  
Overall, the rising popularity and enforceability of bootstrapping has made it so that states 
cannot protect their citizens143 and citizens cannot protect themselves. The Supreme Court’s 
honoring of arbitration clauses over state legislation that was put in place to protect consumers 
and employees appears fundamentally flawed. It is clear that, with the ability to bootstrap, 
businesses can make themselves practically invincible simply by the including a well-engineered 
arbitration agreement. Based on this information and the fact that a recent empirical study 
conducted by Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, and Emily Sherwin found that, for firms that 
impose arbitration clauses on their customers and employees, “less than 10% of their negotiated 
non-consumer, non-employment contracts included arbitration clauses,”144 it is apparent that 
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arbitration clauses have become ways to deter consumers from pursuing their rights instead of 
ways to efficiently resolve disputes. The fact that bootstrapping practically allows corporations 
to exist above the law while they wrong consumers and employees serves as the most significant 
limitation of the arbitration process.  
Appealing the Arbitrator’s Decision 
The cherry on top of all of the shortcomings of arbitration is the fact that the final, 
binding decision made by the arbitrator can only be appealed under very limited 
circumstances145. Even if the decision is considered for appeal, court records show that 
historically when plaintiffs ask the courts for an appeal of an arbitration decision, they almost 
always lose146. The fact that arbitration decisions are protected so heavily even further robs 
consumers and workers of the right to ensure that their disputes are settled fairly.  Even if the 
arbitrator’s award is unfair or illogical147, the decision is rarely overturned, thereby forcing 
plaintiffs to abide by improper rulings. The permanent nature of the arbitration decisions further 
exacerbates the power that corporations have to engineer dispute victories at the expense of the 
consumer or employee. Not only are businesses now able to construct mandatory arbitration 
agreements that establish proceedings that are likely to weigh heavily in their favor, but also they 
are able to guarantee that the resulting unfair decision is permanent. Cementing the shortcomings 
of arbitration by prohibiting relief through an appeal process, the irreversible arbitrator decision 
proves that consumers are offered practically no escape from the harsh realities of business-
friendly arbitration. 
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The Potential Effects of Arbitration’s Shortcomings 
 A process that has evolved into a dispute resolution method that practically guarantees 
minimal corporate harm, arbitration as it currently stands clearly is not a proceeding that 
maximizes justice. The potential effects of these wildly unfair limitations in the arbitration 
process are monstrously detrimental, especially from the perspective of a consumer or employee 
that has been wronged by a corporation. Each pro-business aspect of arbitration that has been 
discussed in this chapter presents some potential for negative consequences. 
 The most obvious effect of the many shortcomings of arbitration is the corporation’s 
victory in arbitration. In a study conducted by Alex Colvin examining data from 3945 arbitration 
cases conducted by the AAA, only 21.4% of employees won cases against their employers148. 
These win rates were even lower when the employer involved in the dispute had been involved 
in multiple arbitrations149, demonstrating the obvious effects of arbitrator biases. The slim 
chances of plaintiff victory are only one of many negative consequences of the flawed arbitration 
system. 
 Also, the rising popularity of bootstrapping due to recent Supreme Court rulings in favor 
of class action waivers offers a wide variety of potential negative effects. For one, the amount of 
enforceable restrictions in arbitration that corporations are able to engineer into their arbitration 
clauses will likely prevent many wronged consumers and employees from even pursuing their 
claims against the business. This injustice allows companies to win out over consumers that they 
have wronged without even arbitrating. Even if these wronged parties choose to pursue their 
disputes, they are more likely to be obstructed from justice and are less likely to receive a 
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favorable ruling because of enforceable bootstrapping. Such a lack of consumer and employee 
fairness throughout the arbitration process is an obvious consequence of all the previously 
mentioned enforceable terms that can be bootstrapped to arbitration clauses. These terms de-
incentivize arbitration from a consumer perspective because they create additional restrictions 
and prohibitive costs150. By honoring these terms, courts and arbitrators alike buttress the agenda 
of corporations seeking to mitigate their legal risk while simultaneously robbing wronged parties 
of their fundamental rights. Currently, the Court does not seem to express concern because 
“consumers and employees voluntarily agree to mandatory arbitration and the attendant 
terms,”151 but clearly the Supreme Court is not considering the fact that most consumers and 
employees do not possess an understanding of or are not even aware that they are bound by 
arbitration clauses. Overall, such negative consequences of arbitration should not be tolerated by 
consumer, workers, or lawmakers.  
 Additionally, engineering arbitration agreements to mandate confidentiality during the 
proceedings allows corporations to conveniently hide their wrongdoings from the public eye. As 
a result, not only will the violation of consumer rights during the proceeding go unnoticed, but 
also the misconduct carried out by the business. For example, if a corporation was producing 
products that were in some way harmful to consumers, demanding private individual arbitration 
for the damages caused by the product would prevent the public from learning of the dangers of 
the item and it would prevent other parties harmed by the product from banding together to seek 
relief. In this instance, a consequence of this negative aspect of arbitration could be physically 
harmful to consumers. This mandated privacy, in combination with class action prevention, 
essentially invites companies to “commit fraud, torts, discrimination, and other harmful acts 
                                                          
150 Leslie, Christopher R. The Arbitration Bootstrap 
151 Ibid. 
54 
 
without fear of being sued.”152 It is easy to imagine the sorts of horrific consequences to which 
this corporate freedom could lead.  
Conclusion 
 Overall, the arbitration process as it exists currently is a mess of unfairness and corporate 
control. The plethora of shortcomings that arbitration proceedings possess yields a plethora of 
negative consequences. As pointed out by Harvey Rosenfield, founder of Consumer Watchdog, 
“the more the US Supreme Court allows big corporations to evade accountability, the less 
confidence Americans [will] have in the judicial branch and [in] the rule of law.”153 It is up to the 
nation to recognize the many limitations of the current arbitration process in order to make 
changes toward a fairer dispute resolution process. Arbitration does offer many benefits over 
traditional litigation, but without controls put in place to prevent corporate manipulation of 
workers and consumers, parties that have been wronged by businesses may never have a chance 
to fully pursue or obtain the relief they deserve.  
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Chapter 4: The Implications of the Rise of Arbitration 
 It has been made clear that arbitration as it currently exists in the American justice system 
possesses an overwhelming amount of limitations from the perspective of the consumer. Of 
course, from the perspective of a corporation, arbitration arguably offers a wide variety of 
benefits and legal protections; unfortunately, these corporate benefits are quite easy to exploit. 
The process currently treats businesses preferentially, which can potentially be taken advantage 
of at the expense of consumers and employees. Such a corrupt, one-sided system possesses the 
potential for procedural manipulation to generate greater corporate gains. 
 There are many implications that must be considered with regard to arbitration’s 
shortcomings. The rising popularity of business-friendly arbitration and the Supreme Court’s 
recent emphasis upon the holistic enforceability of arbitration clauses has the potential to 
discourage harmed parties from pursuing their claims and to cause unfavorable rulings to be 
made by arbitrators against masses of workers and consumers. In addition, in the spirit of 
corporate greed, the arbitration system as it exists currently can be manipulated by businesses 
and developed into a method of unregulated and unfair profit generation. The negative effects of 
these implications are reason enough to advocate for greater regulation over the arbitration 
industry.  
 For one, the business-friendly nature of arbitration and the courts’ acceptance of terms, 
such as class action waivers, will most likely result in a decrease in the amount of consumers and 
workers that actually choose to move forward into arbitration. Considering that the corporate-
engineered facets of arbitration currently tend to incur large costs, it would not be surprising if 
more plaintiffs chose to cease the pursuance of their claims because their litigation costs would 
be too large. These prohibitive costs serve to drive away wronged parties because the cost to 
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arbitrate a small claim individually oftentimes outweighs the maximum potential award the 
plaintiffs can achieve by proceeding with arbitration. This discouragement is most likely a result 
of the rise in class action waivers in the arbitration process: If parties pursuing small claims are 
forced to settle their disputes individually in lieu of pursuing a class action, arbitration will likely 
cost more than the actual claim. Consumers forced to pursue small claims individually are even 
further discouraged by attorney availability for these proceedings, seeing as few attorneys are 
willing to accept cases for claims so small due to the fact that there is not enough reward 
available in exchange for their hard work. Considering the fact that most individuals, attorneys 
and plaintiffs alike, will pursue what offers the greatest reward, it is likely often in a wronged 
party’s best interest to just take their losses instead of risking the incurrence of even higher cost 
obligations due to arbitration.  
 Even if wronged parties choose to continue with the pursuance of their claims in spite of 
the low probability of profiting from the proceedings, they will rarely come out victorious on the 
other side.  This low success rate is another implication of the currently flawed arbitration 
process. According to an investigation recently conducted by the New York Times, of 1179 
cases filed between 2010 and 2014, arbitrators ruled in favor of companies 80% of the time154.  
Given arbitration’s current biases toward corporations, this percentage will likely only increase 
as the years pass. Unfortunately, this falling success rate only exacerbates the issue of plaintiff 
motivation to move forward with arbitration. If the vicious cycle of discouragement from 
proceedings and costly consumer losses continues, corporations may one day be able to obtain 
control over the entire arbitration process.  
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 Corporate control is the most troublesome implication of the arbitration process as it 
exists currently. The ability for businesses to manipulate this system into a profit-generating 
process only increases as courts continue to rely upon corporate favoritism in the arbitration 
process. The best way to fully illustrate the potential that businesses possess to manipulate the 
arbitral system into one of profit generation is by creating a hypothetical scenario. So, imagine 
there is a well-established internet provider that serves millions of customers nationwide. 
Imagine that these customers each, upon activating their service, agrees to a contract that 
contains an arbitration clause loaded with terms that have been engineered to minimize the 
company’s legal risks. In particular, the arbitration clause specifies that all disputes will be 
resolved in mandatory and binding arbitration that will be conducted by an arbitrator of the 
internet provider’s choosing in a venue of the internet provider’s choosing. Additionally, the 
arbitration clauses specify that the arbitral proceedings and all information relating to them must 
be kept confidential. Other terms included in the internet contract’s arbitration clause involve a 
reduction to the statute of limitations that exist in the event of a dispute and limitations that 
specify that damages can only be awarded up to the amount necessary for compensation. The 
arbitration clause also prohibits the rewarding of punitive damages. Finally, the arbitration clause 
contains a class action waiver that demands disputes be settled solely on an individual basis. The 
contracts are presented to consumers on a “take it or leave it” basis and are not open for 
negotiation, but the internet company estimates that about 60% of their customers do not even 
read through all of the contractual terms before signing. 
 Now, imagine that the internet provider executives catch wind of the business-friendly 
nature of arbitration. Imagine that one crafty executive comes into work one morning with an 
idea: the company can use pro-corporation arbitration to unfairly profit from their consumers, 
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and they can do so without much punishment and without fear of being exposed to the public. 
The company decides to move forward with the idea and begins to charge some of its customers 
at random for a small amount, say $75. The charges are presented to customers on their billing 
statements as a “mandatory one-time service fee,” and the trial run of this scheme results in a 
total of one million customer charges. The internet provider finds that approximately 40% of the 
customers that were asked to pay the “fee” paid it without question. This allowed the company to 
earn approximately $30 million.  
 The other 60% of customers that were wrongfully charged contested the fee demands by 
calling the internet provider. After complaining and being told that the fees were necessary for 
security purposes, approximately 10,000 customers capitulate and agree to pay the charges. This 
results in the internet provider obtaining another $750,000 in revenue. The remaining customers 
that have still not paid decide to contest the charge and begin looking into their legal options. 
After consulting with lawyers, the wrongfully charged customers find that, according to the 
contract they signed, their disputes must be settled in individual arbitration that is largely 
controlled by the internet company. Unaware that these “service fees” are harming others as 
well, customers are barred from pursuing class relief that they were unaware of in the first place. 
Seeing that pursuing arbitration will likely cost more than it is worth, another 25,000 customers 
give in and agree to just pay the fee. This results in another $1.875 million on the revenue books. 
Another 5000 of these customers fail to file their claims before the statute of limitations specified 
in their contracts runs out, and as a result they have no choice but to pay the fee. This results in 
another $375,000 in revenue for the internet provider.  
 The remaining 10,000 wrongfully charged customers choose to pursue individual 
arbitration. Even though arbitrator and venue selection likely works in the favor of the internet 
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company during the proceedings and even though the business-friendly nature of arbitration 
likely would result in a corporate victory during at least some of the hearings, for the sake of 
example assume that all 10,000 consumers that chose to arbitrate win their cases. This would 
result in the internet company making payments to cover the compensatory damages for each 
individual customer, which would amount to a total of $750,000.  
 In the end, the internet provider was able to profit a total of $31.5 million from the 
wrongful charging of its customers, even though in the worst-case scenario it lost every case that 
was taken all the way to arbitration. Considering the business-friendly nature of arbitration as of 
recent, this profit number would likely be even higher because the company would inevitably 
win at least some of these arbitration hearings. Overall, the internet company comes out of this 
wrongful fee charging “trial” process with the knowledge that it can largely profit from a 
manipulation of its customers and of the arbitral process in its contractual agreements.  
 Based on this information, it is clear the company can successfully inflate its revenues 
year after year at increasingly larger scales without much kickback. Even further, because of the 
mandated confidentiality in the cases that do make it to arbitration, the company will be able to 
commit these wrongdoings completely out of the public eye. Besides a standard of ethical 
business, the internet provider really has nothing to lose by charging these fraudulent amounts. 
Everyone is either happy or uninformed, except the wronged consumer. 
 The above example illustrates the implications for wrongful business practices that exist 
behind the arbitration process as it stands currently. This is essentially a worst-case scenario 
meant to exemplify how simple it is for a corporation to manipulate the arbitration process in 
order to make a profit. Essentially, it is possible for corporations lacking a strong ethical code to 
profit from the exploitation of consumers, unnoticed by the public, if the scheme is carried out 
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correctly. This requires companies to manipulate arbitration agreements by equipping them with 
the aforementioned conditions in this example. Together, these manipulations serve to aid the 
business in winning arbitration hearings and in discouraging consumers from pursuing their 
claims. This scenario essentially establishes that, if engineered properly, arbitration can be used 
by corporations to commit fraud practically effortlessly. Even further, businesses wishing to 
profit from this manipulation can actually estimate the maximum possible damage that would be 
paid to an individual consumer in the event that they win their arbitration case, as well as the 
amount of consumers likely to actually pursue their small claims individually. From there, these 
companies could calculate the exact charge and customer amounts necessary to maximize profit. 
Overall, businesses stand able to exploit the arbitration process by violating consumer rights 
without damaging their company’s reputation as the arbitral process exists today, and for this 
reason, among many others, arbitration must be regulated to facilitate greater fairness and to 
circumvent greater corporate manipulation.  
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Chapter 5: Solving Arbitration’s Problems 
 Clearly, arbitration presents a number of drawbacks that result in an obstruction of justice 
for non-corporate parties during the dispute resolution process. Fortunately, many of these flaws 
within the current arbitration system can be fixed with the implementation of some additional 
guidance and regulation. Of course, these proposed solutions are much easier said than done, but 
any step taken towards a fairer arbitration process would be incredibly beneficial to the workers 
and consumers that are consistently harmed by business-friendly arbitration.  
 One of the simplest ways to reduce the number of consumers and workers wronged 
through arbitration is by making efforts to further educate Americans. Properly informing 
citizens of their legal rights and of the ins and outs of arbitration will help to reduce the 
previously mentioned problem of the consumer’s lack of understanding of the arbitration 
process. The long-term goal of this increased education would be to integrate arbitration 
education within the scholastic curriculum in high schools and colleges. In the short term, a good 
start would to be to encourage consumers and workers to be sure they understand the terms of 
their agreements before signing any contracts155. In addition, simply encouraging consumers to 
be on the lookout for arbitration clauses in their contracts would be incredibly useful, because, as 
was mentioned previously, most consumers and workers are not aware that they are bound by 
arbitration clauses. Of course, even this move toward a more legally educated and justice-
conscious America may be overreaching, but increasing education about arbitration, even on the 
smallest of scales, as arbitration continues to rise in popularity is the best first step toward 
change.  
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 Greater justice within the arbitration system can also be achieved with additional 
legislation. Given the Supreme Court’s obvious favoritism towards arbitration clauses over the 
past few decades, it appears that additional Congressional legislation or executive action is the 
only way for arbitration to ever move away from its current state of corporate favoritism.  Some 
efforts to improve the arbitration process have already been put into place, but courts still have 
demonstrated that they will uphold an arbitration clause in its entirety156. For example, recently a 
group of senators and representatives in Congress has been proposing an Arbitration Fairness 
Act that would “prevent the enforcement of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate employment 
claims, consumer disputes, civil rights claims, and antitrust violations.”157 This Congressional 
motion is a fantastic step in the right direction, but unfortunately is unlikely to pass any time 
soon. Professor Leslie calls this Act “a partial solution at best” because it fails to address all the 
mistakes that the Supreme Court has made with the FAA158. Given that this proposal does 
nothing to address the wicked unfairness that is allowed in arbitration with regards to 
unconscionable items such as class action waivers, Professor Leslie’s point seems very astute. 
The fact that this Act will likely not pass becomes even more realistic when considering that a 
similar Act, the Fair Arbitration Act, was introduced to Congress in 2011. This Act proposed a 
number of items that would serve to increase fairness within the arbitration process, such as the 
enactment of requirements for fair arbitration clause disclosure, additional rights to ensure 
neutrality, and the ability for parties to opt out of arbitration in favor of a small claims 
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procedure159. Needless to say, this Act was not enacted by Congress, making Professor Leslie’s 
guess that the Arbitration Fairness Act will not be passed either quite considerable. Additionally, 
Senator Al Franken has made efforts to eliminate forced arbitration from consumer and 
employee contracts, but once again this will not likely make it through Congress160. Clearly, 
additional steps need to be taken in order to ensure that justice within the arbitration process is 
safeguarded. 
The following proposed legislation would together serve to make the arbitration process 
more fair and desirable for everyone. Without these adjustments toward fairness, arbitration 
cannot and should not be considered a viable alternative dispute resolution process. As it exists 
currently, it is merely a formality to guarantee that the corporation gets what it wants. Each of 
the following proposals would benefit the fairness of the arbitration process on its own, but 
achieving each of the following pieces of legislation together would serve to fundamentally fix a 
broken arbitration system. It is important to note that these proposals will not address the issue of 
Congress failing to pass any legislation on the issue of arbitration, but it does offer some 
additional jumping off points for Congress to focus upon if the issue of arbitration ever develops 
an importance within the Congressional establishment. Given the gravity of the pro-business 
situation and the amount at which arbitration is currently violating fundamental consumer and 
worker rights, this issue certainly should be taken seriously by Congress if it has not already.  
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I. Limit the Use of Arbitration in Certain Instances 
As was mentioned previously, a bill was introduced to Congress in early February that 
would strictly limit arbitration. If passed, this bill would prohibit “civil rights cases, 
employment disputes, and other crucial lawsuits from being forced into arbitration.”161 
Unfortunately, this bill is likely to face a large amount of opposition162. Limiting arbitration’s 
reach in this way would be incredibly beneficial because it would address the issue of 
corporations facing little punishment for seriously wrongful acts. If disputes regarding 
discrimination or fraud were barred from arbitration, corporations in the wrong would be less 
likely to make it out of a dispute settlement without paying the price for their wrongful acts. 
In addition, this would allow for greater discouragement for companies to commit 
wrongdoing, because they are less likely to be under the cover of confidential arbitration and 
therefore must act more ethically to further protect their business’s image.  
II. Require Post-Dispute Arbitration Agreements or Alternatives to Arbitration 
California lawyer Cliff Palefsky once said that arbitration only works “if both sides 
[want] to participate. Once it’s forced, it’s corrupted.”163 Given the previously mentioned 
issue that arbitration often leaves consumers with no other choice but to submit to mandatory 
arbitration, Palefsky certainly has a point. These required dispute settlement proceedings 
often are agreed to without the consumer’s explicit knowledge, making it all the more 
possible for a business to corrupt the arbitration proceeding. By requiring that both parties 
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agree to arbitrate before moving into the arbitration process, it can be assured that both 
parties to the proceeding are moving forward voluntarily. Even further, this solves the 
problem presented previously about how consumers subject to pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements essentially sign away their fundamental right to a jury trial without even realizing 
it. This would also facilitate the arbitration process, because neither side of the dispute is 
being forced into anything.  According to Honore Johnson, many scholars suggest that a 
voluntary process is much fairer due to the fact that alternative options for dispute resolution 
allow for the parties in dispute to choose the process that best suits their needs164. This of 
course will result in a reduction in litigation protection for corporations, but such a reduction 
appears to be necessary given the pro-business nature of arbitration as it exists currently. 
Overall, offering parties the option to choose whether or not to arbitrate will likely spearhead 
a shift towards neutrality because consumers and workers will not likely choose to arbitrate if 
the proceedings are conducted unfairly.  
III. Prohibit the Honoring of Arbitration Clauses that are Included in Adhesion Contracts 
As was mentioned previously, contracts of adhesion, or contracts that are presented to 
workers and consumers on a “take it or leave it” basis, can require signers to agree to 
incredibly unfair arbitration terms. These adhesion contracts offer signers no escape from 
unfair arbitration engineering due to the fact that consumers are not in a bargaining position 
to refuse consent to arbitrate165. Such a lack of consent should indicate that said arbitration 
clause should not be considered enforceable, but the Supreme Court’s respect for these 
clauses has completely ignored this fact. Even further, according to Stephen Ware, arbitration 
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clauses arising out of adhesion contracts “would often be found procedurally unconscionable 
because of the process of contract formation and inequality of bargaining power.”166 By 
prohibiting arbitration mandated by contracts of adhesion, arbitration would become a much 
more valid and fair alternative to traditional courtroom litigation because it would demand 
greater consent from the parties involved. This additional consent would provide for greater 
fairness due to the fact that corporations are less capable of manipulating consumers that 
have agreed to arbitrate voluntarily, as well as provide for a general reduction of hostility 
between the parties due to the consensual nature of the proceedings.  
IV. Impose More Arbitration Clause Presentation Requirements 
Requiring greater specificity and a clearer presentation of the arbitration clause would be 
one way to attempt to solve the general problem that many consumers are not even aware 
that they are bound by arbitration clauses. Some examples of these increased requirements 
are requiring that arbitration clauses be presented near the beginning of a contractual 
agreement or requiring it to be more noticeable by presenting it in bold and or all capitalized 
letters. This additional requirement would be a great start in making the arbitration process 
fairer because it would increase the likelihood of consumer awareness concerning the 
existence of an arbitration clause in a contract. If consumers begin to notice the existence of 
arbitration clauses with a greater frequency, they may be able to fight for fairer arbitration 
agreements in order to prevent over-bearing corporate control over the procedures.  
V. Make Unconscionable Terms Unenforceable 
Improving arbitration by deeming unconscionable arbitration clause terms unenforceable 
directly addresses the bootstrapping issue discussed in Chapter 4. Of course, passing this 
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legislation will be especially difficult considering the fact that the Supreme Court has made 
numerous decisions advocating for the exact opposite. However, this proposal is perhaps the 
most impactful piece of legislation in the realm of improving arbitration fairness. Deeming 
unconscionable terms unenforceable would safeguard the class action rights of consumers 
and workers, as well as protect rights for specific statutes of limitations, fee-shifting 
provisions, venue and arbitrator selection fairness, and rightful damage awards.  
Of course, refusing to enforce unconscionable terms is mandated when these terms are 
outside of arbitration clauses; however, when these unconscionable terms are included in 
arbitration clauses, determining their unenforceability is in direct violation of the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the FAA. For this reason, as mentioned previously, Congress would 
have to pass legislation regarding these unconscionable terms in order for any change to 
occur in this regard. Such action on the part of Congress would be instrumental to achieving 
a more equal and neutral arbitration process because it would serve to dismantle one of the 
fundamental reasons for why arbitration thus far has facilitated such a colossal amount of 
corporate control. 
At the very least, a massive step toward greater arbitration fairness could be taken simply 
by refusing to enforce class action waivers in arbitration clauses. As was previously 
discussed, class action waivers pose a fundamental problem for consumers wishing to seek 
relief for their small claims because being forced into individual arbitration discourages the 
consumer from even pursuing his or her claim. Barred from taking class action, suddenly 
consumers are faced with a dispute resolution procedure that costs much more than it is 
worth. By removing the enforceability of these waivers, consumers would be able to pursue 
their claims without being discouraged by prohibitive costs, thereby removing the 
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corporation’s previous ability to avoid harmful lawsuits simply by engineering proper 
arbitration procedures. Preventing unconscionable terms that encourage greater prohibitive 
costs overall will allow for greater procedural fairness because consumers and workers will 
no longer be discouraged from pursuing justice simply because they cannot afford it. Overall, 
the creation of legislation that aids parties to take legal action against corporate wrongdoers 
will allow for a much more balanced, neutral arbitration process by forcing the arbitral 
process to surrender some of its facets that have in the past caused the process to be more 
pro-business.  
VI. Safeguard Against Arbitrator Bias 
Parties typically appoint arbitrators to make decisions during the arbitration process. 
Unfortunately, proper engineering of arbitration clauses can ensure that selected arbitrators 
are more inclined to decide in favor of the corporation involved. The arbitrator bias that 
results significantly obstructs justice throughout the arbitration procedure from the consumer 
perspective. One way to approach this arbitrator bias problem is by prohibiting any sort of 
contractual specification about the arbitrator selection process. This way, businesses will be 
less able to engineer bias arbitrator selection because the decision makers are not 
predesignated and will not be selected until the beginning of the arbitration process. This 
minor change in legislation would allow for a greater possibility for the plaintiff to weigh in 
on the arbitrator selection decision. 
Requiring arbitrators to publish the reasoning behind their decisions, which traditional 
court procedures mandate, would additionally help to eliminate the threat of arbitrator bias. 
By making these decisions public, greater transparency and confidence in arbitrator 
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neutrality167 can be achieved because the decisions are much more open for examination. 
This would additionally address the confidentiality issue of the arbitration process because it 
would make decisions available to the public eye. As a result, not only will the decisions 
made by arbitrators be subject to public scrutiny, but also the corporation’s reputation. 
Referring back to Chapter 4, a major reason that arbitration is viewed to have pro-business 
leanings is because it acts as a way for companies to resolve disputes out of the public eye in 
order to protect their reputations, even if it is the public’s best interest to be informed. By 
requiring published arbitrator decisions like in traditional courts, information that is pertinent 
for the safety of the public would also become more accessible, thereby making the 
arbitration process as a whole much more neutral.  
Additionally, centralizing the arbitrator supply would eliminate the “client” issue that 
sometimes arises in arbitration where arbitrators feel inclined to rule in favor of businesses so 
as to be hired again to decide on future proceedings. By creating an arbitral institution 
subsidized by the government that would supply arbitrators instead168, the incentive for 
arbitrators to decide in favor of their “clients” would disappear. It is important to note, 
however, that this shift in the nature of the arbitrator selection process would also put an end 
to the benefits that come with arbitrator selection, such as the fact that individuals with 
expertise in certain fields applicable to the dispute at hand will no longer be available to 
arbitrate. Still, centralizing arbitration in this way would practically eliminate the problem of 
arbitrator bias. 
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VII. Honor Statutory Consumer and Worker Protection Laws 
A fundamental issue with the Supreme Court’s recent treatment of arbitration is that it 
undermines state laws that were put in place to protect its consumers and workers, such as 
the California ban on class action waivers in the Concepcion decision mentioned previously. 
One way to fix the currently corrupted arbitration process in this regard is to honor these 
statutory protections instead of dismissing them in favor of the FAA as the Supreme Court 
has in the past. Of course, this once again is a piece of legislation that can only be achieved 
by going around the Court by way of Congress or an executive order.  
According to Professor Christopher Leslie, states have taken three approaches to protect 
their citizens from overreaching arbitration provisions. These approaches include some of the 
previously recommended legislations in this analysis, such as the prohibition of arbitration 
for certain kinds of disputes, the application of the unconscionability doctrine to make anti-
consumer terms in arbitration clauses unenforceable, and the demand for more a more 
obvious contractual presentation of the arbitration clause169.  In the past, the courts have 
struck down these protections due to their apparent violation of the FAA. As a result, the 
nation is left with the unfair, pro-business arbitration process that exists today. Clearly, an 
allowance of these statutes for greater consumer protection poses the potential to make the 
arbitration process much fairer. 
By allowing for greater consumer and worker statutory protections, the issue of 
bootstrapping is also addressed. This way, it would become much more difficult for 
businesses to engineer arbitration clauses that minimize their litigation risk by way of 
consumer exploitation. As a result, consumers and workers alike would be much more 
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protected, depending on the venue of the dispute, from the obstruction of justice that is 
currently occurring in arbitration proceedings. 
Conclusion 
 Overall, it is clear that there is much that can be done to address the shortcomings of 
arbitration. While Congress has remained relatively silent on the issue for quite some time170, 
their interference is absolutely necessary. If America hopes to see arbitration move away from 
the favoring of businesses over consumers and workers, at least some of the aforementioned 
proposals must be considered. These additional pieces of potential legislation would correct for 
the holes in the arbitration process that currently allow for corporate exploitation to engineer the 
process to work in their favor. If these changes are not made and if the arbitration process 
continues in the business-friendly direction in which it is currently heading, arbitration will be 
seen as nothing more than a way for businesses to cheat consumers and workers and get away 
with it.  
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Conclusion  
 Overall, arbitration does offer a wide variety of benefits that make it a valid alternative to 
traditional trial court proceedings. Because of the fact that it is typically cheaper, faster, less 
risky, and less hostile than traditional litigation, arbitration should absolutely continue to be 
viewed as a legitimate dispute resolution method. However, the significant number of 
shortcomings that arbitration possesses in its current pro-business state make the process 
egregiously unfair and corrupt. Arbitration currently appears to be a method for preserving 
corporate power instead of a method for bringing greater justice and conflict resolution. The 
arbitration process largely favors businesses over consumers and workers because the decisions 
are often prone to arbitrator bias, the unfair enforcement of unconscionable terms in arbitration 
clauses, and the final and binding nature of the arbitrator’s decision. The implications of such a 
pro-business dispute resolution system are quite troublesome and are a general antithesis of 
justice for consumers and workers alike. Because arbitration today essentially guarantees 
corporate victory and because businesses are essentially able to engineer arbitration clauses to 
mitigate their legal risks and protect their reputations, the process as a whole has resulted in a 
mass obstruction of justice and cannot be deemed an acceptable dispute resolution method any 
longer. 
 Of course, one should not blame corporations for wanting to take every step possible to 
protect themselves from litigation risk. The problem with unfair arbitration practices lies in the 
nature of arbitration itself, not in how businesses have been able to abuse it. Overall, fairness in 
this dispute resolution process can only be achieved if Congress takes steps to prevent businesses 
from exploiting the arbitration process as it exists currently. Though it is less likely, courts can 
also take steps toward more fair arbitration processes by refusing to enforce unfair arbitration 
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agreements. A recent ruling rejecting an arbitration clause with a class action waiver in the 
United States Court of Appeals serves as a perfect example of how courts can contribute to the 
transformation of the arbitration process into one that is neutral and fair171.  Further educating 
consumers and workers so that they are better able to protect themselves from exploitation also 
will help achieve greater procedural fairness. In conclusion, these steps, in addition to a general 
increase in regulation over the arbitration process, would allow the dispute resolution method of 
arbitration to once again become a legitimate way to obtain a fair ruling outside of a courtroom. 
Of course, businesses likely will not be very enthusiastic about these necessary changes, but at 
the end of the day, the best way to achieve fairness in this process is to aim to create the most 
level playing field possible.  
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